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THE PRO\L\XE AXD ISSUES OF PHILOSOPHY:
PROFESSOR DEWEY'S VIEWS
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
HAAHXG dealt in a previous brief paper with Professor John
Dewey's idea of method in philosophy, and having found his
position on that initial question unassailable, we now turn to the
equallv fundamental question of the mission, province and particu-
lar business of philosophy.
Granted that philosophers have no private access to truth, no spe-
cial revelations, and are forced to adopt the empirical methods of
science, and never for a moment lose sight of their dependence upon
experience, the question unavoidably arises, what does a rational,
scientific pliilosophy do with its empirical method—what problems
does it attack, what field of human need, interest and activity does
it seek to occupy and govern ?
In the \olume under consideration. Experience and Nature, curi-
ously enough, no distinct chapter or part of a chapter is devoted to a
direct discussion of this paramount question. \\^e have to frame
Professor Dewey's answer thereto after carefully studying sundry
observations and expressions in chapters in which older philosophies
are characterized and in the final chapter on "existence and value."
The la^^k of systematic and direct treatment of the question we
have posited makes the task undertaken rather difficult. P)Ut we
hope to understand Professor Dewey's views and do them full jus-
tice before \enturing a few words of criticism.
Let us. then, quote the more significant and clear utterances in
the volume on the subject of this paper:
"Philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive posi-
tion among various modes of criticism in its generality : a criticism
of criticism, as it were. Criticism is discriminating judgment, care-
ful appraisal, and judgment is .-.ppropriately termed criticism where
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ever the subject-matter of discrimination concerns goods or values."
Criticism is not, Professor Dewey says further on. necessarily
formal, technical, academic. We are all naturally critics ; we coni •
pare, analyze, test, classify and judge. We say, for example, that
this book is original and that book devoid of originality ; that this
musical composition is melodious and pleasing, and that other com-
position empty, dry and tedious. We say this woman is beautiful
and charming, and that other woman plain and cold in manner. We
praise one sermon and rail at another. We admire one building and
remain indifferent to another. All these are instances of appraisal,
or of criticism. The man of science criticizes, and so does the man
on the street. When Professor Dewey tells us that philosophy is
inherently criticism, or a criticism of criticisms, we are, therefore,
led to ask Iwo questions. JVJiat does philosophy criticize, and what
is meant by criticizing criticism? To criticize critics is not merely
to disagree with them ; it is, often, to take e>:ception to their logical
processes. If philosophy criticizes all other criticisms, then it must
be omniscient. It must know everything and challenges premises
:
or, if it makes no claim to universal knowledge, it must simply chal-
lenge the reasoning and the methods of the other critics.
For further light we go back to the volume and to more ques-
tions :
"Philosophy is and can be nothing but this critical operation and
function become aware of itself and its implications, pursued de-
liberately and systematically. It starts from actual situations of
belief, conduct and appreciative perception which are characterized
by immediate qualities of good and bad, and from the modes of
critical judgment current at any given time in all the regions of
value; these are its data, its subject-matter. These values, criticisms
and critical methods it subjects to further criticism as comprehen-
sive and consistent as possible. The function is to regulate the fur-
ther appreciation of goods and bads : to give greater freedom and
security in those acts of direct selection, appropriation, identifica-
tion and rejection, elimination and destruction, which enstate and
which exclude objects of belief, conduct and contemplation."
At this point a few concrete illustrations would be highly desir-
able. Let us take two. There is the anti-child labor amendment to
the federal constitution. Many consider it necessary, just, and pro-
gressive. Others repudiate it as reactionary, dangerous, destructive
and vicious. What does the empirical philosopher think and how
does he reach his conclusions? Let us assume that all philosophers
THE PROVINCE AND ISSUES OF PHILOSOPHY 757
agree in favoring-—or in depreciating—the amendment : why should
the non-philosopher bow to their judgment, unanimous though it
be? And if the philosophers themselves fall out, as is generally the
case, what becomes of the function of philosophy, the criticism of
criticism, and of its authority?
Or take ultra-modern music. Is it legitimate or not? Has it a
future, or will it join other fads and whimsical experiments? Does
Igor .Stravinsky write music, or something totally different from
what for centuries musicians, critics and audiences have called music
and have enjoyed under that name? Now, the music critics, the
specialists, are divided with regard to these matters. The lay lover
of music would be grateful for a criticism of the criticisms, for an
authoritative judgment. Can the philosopher give him that judg-
ment^ If he can, why can he, and what makes him an authority?
If he cannot, then the field of musical criticism is closed to him.
Whence that exception, and how can we be sure that there are not
other exceptions—so many, indeed, as to overthrow the alleged rule?
But let us continue sincerely and hopefully to follow Professor
Dewey's exposition. To quote again:
"Philosophy has no stock of information or body of knowledge
peculiarly its own : if it does not always become ridiculous when it
sets up as a rival of science, it is only because a particular philoso-
pher happens to be also, as a human being, a prophetic man of sci-
ence. Its business is to accept and to utilize for a purpose the best
available knowledge of its own time and place. And this purpose
is criticism of beliefs, institutions, customs, policies with respect to
their bearing upon the good. fXot, however, tlic good, something
attained, formulated
:
philosophy accepts the good it finds diffused
in human experience. "It has the authority of intelligence, of criti-
cism of these common and natural goods." but no other possible
claim to authority.
Again we pause to ask zt'liat it is that makes the philosopher the
super-critic and the wise judge of institutions, customs, beliefs and
policies ; and why the men of science, as well as the lay public, should
regard him as the ultimate court of appeal. And again we are com-
pelled to declare that the quotations fail to furnish satisfactory
answers.
A few more paragraphs from the final chapter of the volume
should, nevertheless, be added. Xo doubt should be left in any can-
did mind i,s to Professor Dewey's definition and characterization of
philosophy.
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''Over-specialization and division of interests, occupations and
goods create the need for a generalized medium of intercommunica-
tion, of mutual criticism through all-around translation from one
separated region of experience into another. Thus philosophy as a
critical organ becomes in efifect a messenger, a liaison officer, making
reciprocally intelligible voices speaking provincial tongues, and
thereby enlarging as well as rectifying the meanings with which
they are charged."
"Nothing but the best, the richest and fullest experience possible
is good enough for man. The attainment of such an experience is
not to be conceived as the specific problem of 'reformers,' but as the
common purpose of men. The contribution which philosophy can
make to this common aim is criticism."
"Onlv in verbal form is there anything novel in this conception
nf philosoohv. It is a version of the old saying that philosophy is
love of wisdom, of wisdom which is not knowledge and which never-
theless cannot be without knowledge. The need of an organon of
criticism which uses knowledge of relations among events to appraise
the casual, immediate goods that obtain among men is not a fact of
philosophv, but of nature and life."
Philosophy is "criticism in the grand manner." or "a critical
methods of developing methods of criticism," in fine.
Professor Dewey's claims may seem wildly extravagant, but we
must not forget his all-important admission, noted in a previous
paper, that, at bottom, philosophy is a branch of ethics. The phil-
osopher, we are to understand, therefore, as a liaison officer, inter-
preter and generalizer, does not pretend to be qualified to settle
fjuestions of physics or metaphysics, or astronomy, or chemistry, or
psvchology. or biology. Tn all these and other regions he is bound
to follow the specialists. It is only in what we call the social and
moral sciences— ethics, economics, politics, history—that the philoso-
pher, because of his breadth of view, his love and cultivation of wis-
dom, his svmpathy with humanity, his searching yet comprehensive
studies, is able to clarify, reconcile, interpret, and "render goods
more coherent more secure and more significant in appreciation."
To illustrate : We cannot ask the empirical philosopher to decide
whether Mars is inhabited or not ; whether the theory of Relativity
is sound ; whether acquired characters are inherited or not : whether
the latest notion of the structure of the atom is likely to prove final
;
whether the use of cooked food is responsible for cancer. These
are scientific questions, and no "criticism in the grand manner" can
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advance their solution. Rut it is the fiuiction and mission of the
philosopher to detect and expose "deficiencies and corruptions in the
scheme and distribution of values that obtain at any period." This.
we presume, means that we 1110y legitimately ask the philosopher to
pass authoritative criticisms upon such ''goods" or values as pro-
hibition, the surtax on incomes, the protective taritT, the rules of the
United States Senate, the Court of International Justice, the Geneva
protocol, the League of Nations, the wage system, the injunction in
labor disputes, the Dawes reparations program, the Russian soviet-
communist system of government, jury duty for women, a national
department of education, preparedness for the next war. the quota
immigration law. the discrimination against non-Nordics, the Ku-
Klux Klan. and a thousand other questions of like nature. Though
the philosopher is not a professional reformer, he is and should be
a lover of justice and reason, of the things which make for the full-
est and richest experience and for abundance of living for all men.
Tf this be Professor Dewev's view of philosophy, it is. of course
a most revolutionary one. Tt abolishes philosophy in the sense given
that term, avowedly or tacitlw l)v all other schools of philosophy,
ancient and modern. But. before such a view can be accepted, many
obscure points will have to be cleared up. Professor Dewey is can-
did enough to say that his conception "also waits to be tried." and
that "the trial which shall approve or condemn it lies in the essential
issue." But it is to be feared that the "essential issue" is too remote
and uncertain. Indeed, it may never come, or be identified if it
should come. Hiunanitv is not static ; it is never without moral
problems; it cannot hope for the elimination of evil and maladjust-
ment. To appeal to the eventual issue is to make scientific tests and
trials impossible in this case.
Besides, what is the teaching of history in respect of the efforts
of even the greatest philosophers to act as liaison officers, speak to
the specialists in a sort of universal tongue, and criticize in a grand
manner?
There was Plato, assuredly a great philosopher and a wise man.
ITe could not rid himself of the belief in slavery; some of the goods
or values of his time were decidedly doubtful and poorly distributed
;
and his philosophy, save so far as it was abstract, suffered from the
same limitations. ^Marcus .\urelius was a philosopher, and his doc-
trines were noble, yet he attended the inhuman gladiatorial contests,
never uttered a word against them and appears to have enjoyed
them as much as the vulgar herd did.
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August Comte, to come down to modern times, was a great phil-
osopher, yet he proposed a bizarre substitute for Catholicism and
tried to found a religion of Humanity ! Humanity has been guilty
of many things, but not of self-worship ; it knows its own limita-
tions too well for that crowning absurdity. The philosopher in this
case is scarcely remembered for his performances as liaison officer
and critic in the grand manner.
Herbert Spencer was a great generalizer and original thinker.
Indeed, he proposed a philosophy based synthetically on all the sci-
ences, and, like Professor Dewey, claimed the role of guide, critic
and prophet for the philosopher; but, in his political, economic and
social ideas Spencer was a prejudiced, most limited middle-class
Englishman. He convinced himself that his opposition to free
schools, free libraries, trade unions, land reforms, and like matters,
followed with irresistible logic from certain "first principles," but
very few thinkers of his day were impressed by his deductive reason-
ing in the premises. His vigorous individualism was temperamen-
tal, not logical. His conclusions were often rejected by those who
accepted his premises. He caused bitter controversy, was claimed
by reactionaries, repudiated by liberals, and finally became a pas-
sionate special pleader.
These examples hardly warrant the hopes or expectations of
Professor Dewey in respect of the influence of philosophy on the
improvement, enrichment and distribution of desirable goods
!
And, pray, is there any reason to think that future philosophers
will succeed where present and past philosophers have failed? After
all, what can the philosophers do to achieve, maintain and command
authority ? They can study, ponder, inquire, accumulate knowledge,
draw inferences and deduce propositions. We can all do the same
thing, and it is impossible to determine at what stage or point in
the process of gathering, classifying, digesting and interpreting facts
the mere man of science, or the educated layman, enters the high
rank of philosophers. We cannot certify and license philosophers
;
we cannot create a monopoly of philosophy. Where competition is
free and unlimited, the fittest, indeed, survive, but we have been
warned again and again by evolutionists not to confound fitness to
survive under given conditions with superiority or excellence in a
moral sense. The pseudo-philosopher, the pretender, may easily
prevail over the modest, retiring, gentle, wise philosopher who scorns
the tricks of the market.
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Professor Dewey speaks of the pernicious and demoralizing in-
fluence on thought of caste, class, party, self-interest, vested privi-
lege, institutionalized movement, outworn tradition. All these ob-
stacles to progress, to an abundant life for all. to justice and beauty
in human conduct, are terribly real and at times all but unconquer-
able. But how is the philosopher to overcome them? He has, we
have seen, no special weapons, no peculiar means. Bias, dogma,
egotism, pride, and vanity we shall always have with us in social
concerns, and we must learn to avoid errors by painful experience,
from our trials, failures and successes. There is no short philo-
sophic cut to Utopia.
We are driven to conclude that Professor Dewey's conception of
philosophy will seem to many well-nigh fatal. Mr. Bertrand Rus-
sell perceives this, and has no hesitation in admitting, or affirming'
rather, that philosophy, if it is to live and serve at all, must have a
distinct province of its own, and must consist of propositions which
could not occur to the other sciences, or be either proved or dis-
proved by them. Professor Dewey refers to some of Mr. Russell's
philosophic views, but. strangely enough, does not challenge or criti-
cize his conception of the function and province of philosophy. We
have a right to ask Professor Dewey to note and comment upon
the objections of such thinkers as Professor Russell to his definition
of philosophy, as well as to reassure inquiring and wisdom-loving
laymen—to whose class the present writer belongs—concerning the
future of a philosophy reduced to the position of a branch of ethical
science—a science notoriously inexact—and dependent on the prop-
ositions and conclusions of the other sciences. Persistent failure to
answer objections and offer explanations demanded in good faith
by serious students of the evolution of philosophy on an issue so
central and crucial as that under discussion here—namely, the field,
business and function of philosophy—could not fail to beget misgiv-
ings, misconstruction and even ironical or flippant attacks on philos-
ophy as such.
Nature. Man and Society in Doctor Dewey's System
We have examined and criticized Professor John Dewey's views
of the right or only possible method in philosophy and of the func-
tion and province of the sort of knowledge and formulated thought
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called })hilosiipliv. Let us now. bearing in mind Professor Dewey's
definitions and pivotal conceptions, turn to his discussion of other
important questions in the volume under consideration, entitled
Experience and Nature. Let us for the moment lay aside all objec-
tions to his startling and revolutionary—not to say destructive—idea
of the essential business of philosophy. Granted, for the sake of the
argument, that philosophy is "criticism of criticism," synthetic guid-
ance in the wilderness of human life, an effort to correct, complete
and improve ethical values, as well as to secure a wider and fairer
distribution of desired and desirable goods ; granting all this, we are
led to ask what Professor Dewey thinks of man, society, nature, cos-
mic law. and the ethical process within that law.
It is evident that these are extremely interesting topics from any
philosophical, or metaphysical, or religious, or moral point of view.
It is perhaps equally evident that one may accept every proposition
advanced by Doctor Dewey in respect of the subjects just mentioned
while rejecting his conception of the mission and domain of phil-
osophy.
We may begin with Professor Dewey's description of "exist-
ence." or of the nature of the existential world in which we live. We
must look at the facts and events without preconceived notions, says
the author, and forget theories of pessimism and optimism. What,
if we look around us, do we see ? To quote the answer
:
"Man finds himself living in an aleatory world ; his existence, to
put it baldly, involves a gamble. The world is a scene of risk ; it is
uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable. Its dangers are irregular,
inconstant, sporadic, episodic. . . . Plague, famine, failure of crops,
disease, death, defeat in battle, are always just around the corner,
and so are abundance, strength, victory, festival and song. . . . The
sacred and the accursed are potentialities of the same situation ; ana
there is no category of things which has not embodied the sacred
and accursed
—
persons, words, places, times, directions, stones,
winds, animals, stars. . . .
"Alan fears because he exists in a fearful and awful world. The
world is precarious and perilous. Despite science and art. technique
and fancy," the fundamentally hazardous character of the world is
not seriously modified, much less eliminated.
"We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mix-
ture of sufificiencies, tight completeness, order, recurrences which
make possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguities,
uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet
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indeterminate. They are mixed not mechanically but vitally, like
the wheat and tares of the parable. . . . Qualities have defects as
necessary conditions of their excellences ; the instrumentalities of
truth are the causes of error; change gives meaning to permanence
and recurrence makes novelty possible."
Well, into this sort of world man is born. The facts and events
bewilder nini ; he tries to understand and interpret : his early ideas
are childish and shallow, and we call them superstitions. But error
can be corrected only by experience, by more facts and more knowl-
edge. "Man is naturally philosophic." says Professor Dewey, rather
than coldly scientific, and he soon learns to form what we call sub-
jective judgments—ideas of value, utility, good, evil and danger.
"Man naturally prized knowledge only for the sake of its bearing
upon success and failure in attaining goods and avoiding evils." Man
has always needed knowledge and wisdom, instinct being insufficient
in his case. .\nd he needs knowledge today, because it is "just this
predicament of the inextricable mixture of stability and certainty,"
of order and progress, of truth and error, of ugliness and beauty,
that "gives rise to philosophy."
It is arbitrary and futile to talk of absolutes, of realities behind
appearances, of fixed and eternal standards. Man must not quarrel
with nature, or impute to it his own ideas. He is bound to study
nature of Avhich he is part, and to whose terms and conditions he
must conform if he cares to live and enjoy comfort and leisure. To
conform to nature is not, of course, to acquiesce passively and
meekly in existing arrangements. Man can modify natural condi-
tions to a certain extent, and he even thinks at times that he is supe-
rior to nature or better than nature. This for a time is a natural
enough delusion, but it is a delusion. When man stops to ask him-
self candidly what his relation to nature is, what is his answer likely
to be? Professor Dewey says:
"It goes without saying that man begins as a part of phvsical and
animal nature. In as far as he reacts to physical things on a strictly
physical level, he is pulled and pushed about, overwhelmed, broken
to pieces, lifted on the crest of the wave of things, like anything
else. His contacts, his sufiferings and doings, are matters of direct
interaction only. He is in a state of nature." As an animal, even
upon the brute level, he manages to subordinate some phvsical things
to his needs, converting them into materials sustaining life and
growth."
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But of course, humanity long ago graduated from the "state of
nature" and obedience to bhnd appetite. It has ideas, knowledge,
art, moral systems ; it reflects and exercises choice. It restrains
appetite, sublimates, and subordinates some desires or goods to other
desires or goods. Still, Professor Dewey admonishes us as follows
:
"It is the part of wisdom to recognize how sparse and insecure
are such accomplishments in comparison with experience in which
physical and animal nature largely have their way. Our liberal and
rich ideas, our adequate appreciations, due to productive art, are
hemmed in by an unconquered domain in which we are everywhere
exposed to the incidence of unknown forces and hurried fatally to
unforeseen consequences. Here indeed we live serviley, menially,
mechanically ; and we so live as much when forces blindly lead us
to ends that are liked as when we are caught in conditions and ends
against which we blindly rebel."
What, then, are we to do? The answer is, We must use our
intelligence and our reason more and far more effectively than we
are doing even in our comparative advanced stage of civilization.
"Fidelity to the nature to which we belong as parts, however weak,
demands that we cherish our desires and ideas till we have converted
them into intelligence, revised them in terms of the ways and means
which nature makes possible." The best in us is as natural as the
worst : ideals are as natural as facts ; visions of beauty as perceptions
of ugliness. "The striving of man for objects of imagination is a
continuation of natural processes ; it is something man has learned
from the world in which he occurs, not something he arbitrarily in-
jects into the world. When he adds perception and ideas to these
endeavors, it is not after all he who adds ; the addition is again the
doing of nature and a further complication of its own domain. To
act, to enjoy, and suffer, in consequence of action ; to reflect, to dis-
criminate and make differences in what had been but gross and
homogeneous good and evil, according to what inquiry reveals of
causes and effects ; to act upon what has been learned, thereby to
plunge into new and unconsidered predicaments ; to test and revise
what has been learned ; to engage in new good and evils, is human
—
the course which manifests the course of nature."
Man must not magnify his importance in nature, but neither
should he belittle himself and his powers. "When he perceives
clearly and adequately that he is within nature, a part of its inter-
actions, he sees that the line to be drawn is not between action and
thought, or action and appreciation, but between blind, slavish, mean-
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ingless action, and action that is free, significant, directed and re-
sponsible."
To repeal, we must make better use of our intelligence. To quote
again
:
''Because intelligence is critical method applied to goods of belief,
appreciation and conduct, so as to construct freer and more secure
goods, turning assent and assertion into free commimication of
parable meanings, turning feeling into ordered and liberal sense,
turning reaction into response, it is the reasonable object of our
deepest faith and loyalty, the stay and support of all reasonable
hopes."
But while urging the conscientious use of intelligence. Professor
Dewey warns us repeatedly against millennial expectations or
romantic illusions. He is no Utopian. PTe calmly and simply points
to the choice which lies before us. On the one hand, "authority,
imitation, caprice, ignorance, passion and prejudice" ; on the other,
the method of intelligent criticism and comparison, of thoughtful
valuation, of the use of science and the art of thinking, of the union
of knowledge and ethical values in the process of production.
What is the situation today: what sort of civilization is ours?
Doctor Dewey answers: Beliefs are too often determined bv passion,
class-interest, routine, tradition and authority : in morals, as m
esthetics, there is almost hopeless confusion : culture is esoteric and
religion alien and supernatural : goods are unequally distributed, and
criticisms of the mjustices in societv is a monopolv of professional
reformers. The work of scientific criticism is done poorly, if at all.
and humanity lacks leadership and educational opportunity.
Two final quotations on the function of reason and the social
and ethical effects of the ap])lication of intelligence to the problems
of life:
"Till tlie art of achieving adt:quate and liberal perceptions of the
meaning of events is incarnate in education, morals and industry,
science will remain a special luxury for the few : for the mass it
will consist of a remote and abstruse bodv of curious propositions
having little to do with life, except where it lays the heavy hand of
law upon spontaneity, and invokes necessity and mechanism to wit-
ness against generous and free aspiration."
When an art of thinking as appropriate to human and social
affairs has grown up as that used in dealing with distant stars, it
will not be necessary to argue that science is one among the arts and
among the works of art. It will be enough to point to observable
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situations. The separation of science from art. and the division of
arts into those concerned with mere means and those concerned with
ends in themselves, is a mask for lack of conjunction between power
and the goods of life."
Professor Dewey demands, then, that philosophy shall do ii:>
part in effecting the conjunction now lacking, freeing thought, liber-
ating energy, improving the means of social communication and har-
monizing the interests of so-called individuals with those of the
body social and politics. It is of course impossible not to second this
demand, not to share this aspiration even though we may find Pro-
fessor Dewey's conception of philosophy unsatisfactory and arbi-
trary. It should be added that every enlightened and progressive
person, whether philosopher, scientist, professional man. employer,
wage worker, or artist is bound, along with the school of philosophy
ably represented by Professor Dewey, to work actively, in his or
her own sphere, for the noble ends just indicated.
In a final paper, we shall deal with the major metaphysical, psy-
chological and logical propositions in Professor Dewey's important
work.
